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The author concentrates on the methodological aspects of a theory of language in which one 
could explain all basic problems related to natural language, especially such as the 
phenomenon of meaning, language acquisition, knowledge of language, the relation between 
natural language and the language of thought etc. She believes we should develop 
Wittgensteinian approach where the category of use plays the central role in explaining 
meaning. We should also reject double aspect theories of meaning and treat language as a 
natural phenomenon functioning in our daily life, and ontologically as an abstract object 
which has to be examined. Additionally, she claims that we should elaborate the ideas which 
are the underlying reasons for the three projects in philosophy: minimalism, naturalism and 
pragmatism. The author argues in favor of some given, previously elaborated and specified 
theses which she derives from each of them.   
 
 
Use as an initial research category 
When we agree with a Wittgensteinian dictum according to which „meaning is use”, 
we do not make a simple theoretical manoeuvre of replacing the category of meaning with the 
category of use, but we change our investigative perspective in a fundamental way. The 
notion of meaning does not equal the notion of use. In the studies inspired by Wittgensteinian 
philosophy we are not looking for the answer to the question: what is meaning (the idea, the 
concept, mental state?), but to the question how is it possible that expressions of language are 
meaningful. It involves certain ontological commitments to accept claims according to which 
there is no such entity as meaning, and there is not such thing as language in itself. We should 
rather speak about multiplicity of language games and about variety of functions of the 
language games which make language elements meaningful. We can describe meanings of 
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language expressions and sentences (Satze) describing their use. Treating use category as 
crucial in our theory lets us render the complexity of language functions because we are not 
trying to single out its essential, substantial function (the most fundamental and pivotal 
property which would make language language). In traditional accounts, especially in truth-
conditional theories of meaning, there was such a property, namely, the referential character 
of language (aboutness in some views) and the possibility of asertoric discourse connected 
with that. In post-Wittgensteinian theories it is acknowledged that language functions are 
various and they depend on a certain language game in which language expressions are used. 
There are games in which the notion of reference (a cat means cat) plays the crucial role in 
explaining them. There are games in which the referent can be satisfied by any suitable object 
(e.g. in demonstratives), and games where the existence of objects to which we refer is not an 
important matter at all (e.g. „tralalala”). The meanings of language expressions in all language 
games can be described because they function within language practices and we can describe 
them exploring the category of language use.  
 
The object of studies: language which is not only an empirical entity 
It is difficult for a philosopher of language to avoid answering the questions about the 
ontological status of the object of his studies. To put it another way, we can always ask what 
is that something we call a language in our investigations. There is no agreement within the 
theories of meaning about the way language should be treated and about the way it should be 
investigated. The ontological questions I raise here have a fundamental character. If we 
assume that language can be studied from different points of view (like in post-
Wittgensteinian approaches), we have to decide what kind of properties make our object of 
studies the entity we in fact research. When we say ‘language’, do we mean the language of 
the individual, the unique idiolect or do we rather mean the abstract object which is idealized 
after studies of particular idiolects, a kind of common language? Is the possibility of 
communication the most important feature of human language? If there was a language 
without communicative function, would we call it  language at all? Do we take into account a 
certain ethnic language – all examples used by us as philosophers basically come from 
standard European languages -  or do we rather assume that there is such a thing as universal 
language? When we write ‘language’ do we mean the set of meaningful sounds or 
inscriptions, or rather the sounds or inscriptions itself that potentially can be meaningful? 
When we talk of sentences do we mean sentences-types or sentences-tokens and what is the 
ontological status of the types here? (Botterill, Carruthers 1999). Are we forced to follow the 
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post-Fregean tradition in which the notion of Sinn is introduced: objective, general, 
immaterial, abstract, constant entity, existing independently of language understood as a set of 
signs? The questions above, though detailed, are not insignificant. They all show us the basic 
problem of all language researchers, the problem of deciding on the status of the object of 
study. The dispute about language and the way we can treat it can be found in almost every 
discussion which is held among philosophers of language; especially when we use the notion 
of language as if it was an entity with indisputable features. We should find the middle ground 
between two radical views: between an extreme naturalistic account on the one side, where 
language is treated as a set of sounds and inscription tokens without semantics, and a Fregean 
view according to which language is a set of signs whose meanings are abstract, objective and 
exist in the third realm like Plato’s ideas.  
Developing a  theory of meaning as use allows us to describe language which 
functions in everyday life of humans. When we investigate meaning from use category 
perspective, we initially take for granted that basically language is something which is used. 
We assume the simple and obvious fact about language, namely the fact that people use it in 
their everyday practice. We assume also that the philosopher of language investigates a 
certain idealized object whose properties can be determined by the examination of actual uses. 
It can be said that we deal with language tokens (sentences and expressions accessible with 
the help of certain sounds and inscriptions), but they are not just sounds and inscriptions, 
because they are used in a restricted way in practice, which means that they are meaningful 
according to the elaborated view. It is a task for a  theory of meaning to characterize their 
peculiarity.  
 
Methodological aspects of the late Wittgensteinian approach to language  
There are few Wittgensteinian traces which I find important for the current study. I 
will enumerate them and shortly describe now. 
Wittgenstein wants to take out the mystery of meaning which has always been 
connected with that notion in philosophical investigations. The mystery is understood here as 
the classic essence of meaning and the need of finding it in our research (Wittgenstein 1998, 
§92, p. 43/43e/66 and §371, p. 116/116e/166). He considers language which functions in 
natural situations in everyday human existence. We can understand that as a rejection of the 
Cartesian paradigm and its res cogitans/res extensa division, and the rejection of the double-
aspect theories of meaning.  
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 The notion of meaning is objective in the sense that the correctness of use of a given 
expression does not depend on the individual decision of a language user. Language is 
autonomous but also social. People can use language incorrectly because of the fact that the 
correctness of language use is conditioned by the normative rules. According to many 
contemporary theories of meaning, language is the effect of the biological evolution of the 
human species, hence it is given to the whole species, not to the individual human being 
(Pinker 1994, Pinker 1997). It is underlined there that there is an important relation between 
using language and the existence of personal identity. Subjectivity is constituted by the ability 
to make judgements, and that can be done because of the capacity for using language (Luntly 
2003, p. 67). It is worth mentioning that it was Wittgenstein for whom exploring the notion of 
meaning was connected with some psychological investigations.  
 Wittgenstein in his late philosophy treats language as an element of natural history of 
humans. He points out also that we should analyse natural phenomena in philosophy, and 
language is one of them. However, there is a major difference between Wittgenstein’s 
methodology and methodological recommendations which can be found in contemporary 
theories of meaning. It is an attitude towards scientific methods in formulating theories. 
Wittgenstein claims that the difference between philosophy and science is really fundamental, 
hence asking questions, raising problems, and fixing goals are different in both those 
domains. Consequently, we will not resolve philosophical problems within scientific theories 
as it is hoped today (pointing to the results in psychology and neurology for example) 
(Williams 1999, p. 240-259; Kelly 1984, p. vii.). It is important to add that the 
Wittgensteinian rejection of scientific methods in philosophy does not close the door for 
philosophical theorizing. He does not propose one single method in describing language facts, 
but several, interconnected methods which will make such description possible from different 
points of view. To make it clear, Wittgensteinian rejection of making philosophy scientific is 
not an attack on science per se, but it is rather the consequence of his views about the role of 
philosophy (Conway 1989, p. 33 and S. Shanker 1997, p. 9). 
The main element of Wittgenstein’s methodology concerning his account of language 
is the role of practice. This is the case for two reasons. Firstly,  his view is that practice is 
something primary. Language games can be described because of certain language practices. 
Secondly, because he rejects double-aspect theories of meaning (Wittgenstein 1998, §120, p. 
48-49/48e-49e/74-75 and §138, p. 53/53e/81). In double-aspect theories of meaning 
(animatory) one assumes that a symbol (a sign) is meaningful because of „something” which 
makes it „alive” (the content, sense etc.). The symbol itself is just a sound or inscription. The 
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main goal of such theories is to show the source of animation mentioned. According to many 
superficial interpretations of Wittgenstein’s theory, the author of Investigations claims that 
practice is the source of animation of the symbol (the sign). As a result his theory is numbered 
among socio-functional and radically conventional theories of language. There is no 
justification for this in Wittgensteinian methodology. He does not explain the notion of 
meaning by appealing to the social character of language because he rejects double-aspects 
theories of meaning, hence ‘the social’ does not play an explanatory role in his work. The 
critique of double-aspect theories produces the effect of a unique - not traditional - treatment 
of the category of practice (Wittgenstein 1969, p. 24, 67). Wittgenstein opposes the view 
according to which there are two distinct elements of the symbol (the sign). On the contrary: 
he claims that the symbols (the signs) are something primary and simple, they cannot be 
divided into more simple elements. Both, Zeichen and Satze are  signs and  expressions in use. 
That being so, Wittgenstein is not obliged to answer the question about the source of 
animation of symbols (signs) – the source of their meaningfulness. In the process he could not 
say that practice is that source (Wittgenstein 1969, p.26).  
 
Taking Wittgensteinian traces at their face value I additionally claim that we should elaborate 
the ideas which are the underlying reasons for three projects in philosophy: naturalism, 
minimalism and pragmatism. I argue in favor of some given, previously elaborated and 
specified theses which I derive from each of them. I am going to point out some of them, 
concentrating especially on the first one. 
 
Naturalism as an appropriate philosophical perspective 
I support the naturalistic point of view according to which language is treated as a natural 
element of the world, an element of human biology and historically variable human culture. 
Language so described can be characterized from the different points of view and by different 
methods, including scientific ones (but they are not the only ones, and what is more, they are 
not the most important ones). First of all, our methods should be selected with a view to aims 
we are going to reach in our theory, hence it is not easy to decide in advance which methods 
would be the most appropriate. Secondly, there are many different methods in science and in 
order to choose one of them we need to know certain scientific solutions concerning the 
matter we are interested in, which requires suitable competence to value them. It does not 
mean that as philosophers we cannot use scientific answers for philosophical purposes, but it 
means that it is not possible to replace philosophical investigations with scientific ones. I 
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claim that philosophy has its own independent methods and that we should raise ontological 
and metaphysical matters in connection with language. It is especially promising to combine 
the Wittgensteinian requirement of characterizing the category of meaning in terms of the 
category of use with the methodological demand of treating meanings as abstract objects (a la 
Frege, though without Fregean ontological commitments). Formulating a theory of meaning 
does not consist in exploring empirical facts (like in the positivist vision of science), but in 
constructing a philosophical theory in which we describe actual language practice. We 
examine observable objects – written or spoken sentences and expressions – but we do raise 
general and metaphysical questions at the same time. It is rightly claimed in naturalism that 
language is not a mystery object with a hidden nature, but it is natural very sophisticated 
equipment of humans. The main difficulty in studying language appears when we want to 
describe the complexity of language in one unified theory. In the naturalistic approach as I 
understand it, language is treated as a historically changeable set of language games. I find it 
promising, although there is no hope of finding definitive and final answers here.  
Let me explain a few things about the metaphysical research I have mentioned above. 
According to many Wittgensteinian experts, he rejects all forms of metaphysics (Hacker 
1998, p. 13 and Putnam, H. 1995). If they are right, I claim that we should abandon this 
element of his philosophy. Conducting metaphysical analyses is a crucial component of 
research in philosophy of language as long as we understand them as investigating historically 
changeable human language, but language which cannot be treated only as an empirical 
object. Metaphysics is not understood traditionally here. So we do not look for the so called 
essence of language, and we do not reach one correct description or one possible theory. It 
was Wittgenstein who persuaded us to introduce a certain kind of order in our way of treating 
language, but he did not believe that it can be given once and for all. Hence, the aim of our 
theory is to gain full description of the phenomenon of language in its day-by-day use and I 
treat it as a research postulate. As a result, we will have many theories and many answers to 
the question of what language is, answers which are initially determined by the assumptions 
we already have taken. Studying the assumptions of  theories is the most important part of 
metaphysical approach to language as I understand it.  
It can be misleading to call the Wittgensteinian approach naturalistic without stating 
further reservations, especially taking into account the sheer number of different naturalistic 
theories we can find in contemporary philosophy of language. It is not easy to define 
naturalism. Let us assume that the most basic thesis of naturalism is that natural is everything  
which means that it belongs to the world of nature. This general statement will be explanatory 
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only when we specify what ‘nature’ and ‘natural’ mean  (Feldman 1999, p. 170-186; Kim 
1998, p. 381-406 Quine, p. 20-43 Guttenplan 1994, p. 449). There are two consequences for 
philosophical investigations which we can derive from that thesis. First: the Quine’ian 
postulate to study everything which we decide is worth studying using scientific, empirical 
methods. Second: the demand of treating all entities of the human world as natural ‘effects’ of 
human history and human development. Taking these consequences for granted, we claim that 
there are no supernatural entities which philosophy has a privilege to study (Wittgenstein 
1969, p.29)
2
. In other words, philosophy is not the so called first science, and there are no 
such entities as Plato’s ideas, Descartes’ res cogitans or Kant’s noumena. Hence, philosophy 
is not a base for natural science, as it has been treated in some philosophical views. It is 
important to realize that Quine’ian postulate of naturalising epistemology has several 
consequences for doing philosophy. Quine claims for example that while doing ontology we 
should inspect the idea of wide-spread acceptance of the domain of physical objects in all 
areas of studies. We should do that in order to examine the implicit underlying assumptions 
which are taken for grated together with the idea above-mentioned. Philosophers are 
interested in the ontological status of language, in the way we treat such expressions like x 
exist and in all following consequences. Scientists do not openly deal with such problems, but 
they tacitly use ontological and metaphysical assumptions in their theories. It counts also for 
language investigations in linguistics, psycholinguistics, psychology and evolutionary 
biology. Philosopher’s task is to analyse these assumptions and make them explicit. We can 
develop naturalistic account without excluding the importance of philosophical questions and 
philosophical answers to them. Let me repeat myself, in order to be a naturalist we do not 
have to exchange all philosophical matters for scientific ones (Quine 1969, p. 69-90).  
Wittgenstein’s theory can be interpreted as a naturalistic account only in an anti-
scientific sense. Wittgenstein opposes scientism in philosophy and he rejects the traditional 
metaphysics with its requirement of looking for deeply hidden essences. His unique 
naturalism consists in several tightly connected claims which I have already mentioned. Let 
me enumerate some of them again: He underlines the need for idiosyncratic attitudes in 
philosophy (instead of construing general theories) (Wittgenstein 1969, p.67). He treats 
meanings, thoughts, mental processes, logic as common phenomena which can be studied in 
practice. The social context is for him an important factor in describing them, and he does not 
look for hidden essences or fundamentals. Philosophy in his view is a kind of therapy and a 
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special kind of description. In Wittgensteinian naturalism there is no place for the enthusiasm 
about scientific methods incorporated into philosophy, and there is no idea of progress which 
should be applied to the philosophical theories (unlike in natural sciences). To sum up, the 
aim of philosophy is to establish an order in knowledge we already have, not extending it 
(Wittgenstein 1998, §128, p. 50/50e/76).  
 
Few words about minimalism 
If we initially agree with Wittgenstein that in order to know something about meaning of 
language expressions we have to study their use, and if we think that the aim of the theory of 
meaning is to take the mystery out of meaning, we will become adherents of a  special kind of 
minimalism in the theory of meaning
3
. The best known philosopher who supports semantic 
deflationism as a kind of minimalism in the theory of meaning is Paul Horwich. Let me just 
briefly sum up his view. He claims that meaning is use, he accepts deflationism in the theory 
of truth according to which we are inclined to accept the instances of the schema p is true iff 
p;  and he insists that meanings are concepts and that we are able to describe the total use of 
an expression by studying the acceptance property it has (Horwich 1998, p. 46)
4
.  
Minimalism can be also characterized in another way. Let us have a look at Tim 
Thorton’s description from his book devoted to Wittgensteinian philosophy. First of all, in all 
minimalist theories it is underlined that the individuation of meanings is possible because of 
language practice and the techniques of use of language expressions. Secondly, the capacity 
of understanding language is treated as a primary and simple one. That capacity can be 
characterized by describing use in which it is manifested. In other words, when we explain 
language understanding, the only category we need is the category of use. Pointing to practice 
as an explanatory category does not mean that the explanation is a kind of reductive one, 
hence it does not mean that the category of understanding can be reduced to some more 
simple categories. It does not mean, either, that we can develop a double-aspect theory of 
language meaning  (Thornton 1998, p. 92). Such a minimalism is a kind of view that opposes 
essentialism and scepticism concerning meaning, and it is also connected with naturalism, for 
as H. Putnam claims the best description of naturalization is deflation. (Putnam 1995, p. 62-
63).  
                                                 
3
 See Horwich’s semantic deflationism and use theory of meaning (Horwich 1998). 
4
  The following constraints of the theory of meaning have been abondon in Horwich’s view: The Understanding 
Constraint, The Relationality Constraint, The Representation Constrain, The Aprioricity Constraint; The 
Compositionality Constraint, The Normativity Constraint). And the only one is in fact count as a real one, 
namely The Use Constraint (Horwich 1998, p. 13 and 39). 
 9 
 
Pragmatism and its important points 
The ideas which are the underlying reasons for pragmatism help us to realize why we 
do philosophy at all. I see pragmatism as Putnam does, namely as a metaphilosophical 
approach according to which philosophy is the domain of knowledge and the domain of 
culture, and its theories are the result of a commitment to important human matters. What is 
more, a philosophers themselves cannot avoid answering the question about their own point 
of view and about the values and assumptions which they take
5
. Generally speaking, 
according to pragmatism as a certain way of reasoning, all philosophical solutions have given 
practical results. Philosophy is an important human activity because of these practical results. 
It is worth doing philosophy only when philosophical solutions influence practice. Philosophy 
can be influential because it forms certain ways of reasoning, it preserves certain ideas, it 
gives them importance, hence it affects various areas of human life. One of the crucial aims of 
philosophy is a critical analysis of the foundations of philosophical theories themselves, and 
the views of the philosopher who tries to understand himself and world phenomena. It applies 
to a philosopher of language as well.  
The therapeutic character of Wittgensteinian philosophy can be interpreted as a 
postulate of doing critical metatheoretical considerations in philosophy (metaphilosophy). It 
would mean that as philosophers we do not propose alternative theories, but we are trying to 
show what kind of reasoning shapes the theories which already exist, what kind of questions  
and why, we raise in those theories, what kind of methods we are ready to employ. Such an 
attitude would result for Wittgenstein in gaining a theoretical peace, the state in which we will 
stop raising questions, not because they will be solved, but because we will realize they are 
not  real ones (Putnam 1995, p.92).  
It seems to me that the metaphilosophical perspective has been for a while the 
distinctive feature of analytic philosophy (Hacker 1998, p. 3-34).  From such a perspective, 
you have to be careful about your own assumptions, about the status of the object of your 
studies and the methods which you use. As a result of such an attitude, we can raise the most 
important matters: such as the problem of what philosophy is, what kind of problems should 
be called philosophical ones, and what kind of philosophical notions are the proper ones. 
Somehow we have forgotten about the perspective I have described  here. We develop such 
branches of philosophy as philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of 
language, copying the methods of science in the process. And like in science, there is no place 
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for critical thoughts about the status of the theories themselves. Philosophers have started 
answering the questions about the world itself (about natural language, mental processes, 
cognitive processes etc.) but they have stopped investigating the assumptions which have to 
be taken in order to raise those questions. The importance of the analysis of notions 
(concepts) is not a crucial factor of analytic philosophy as it used to be, which is a pity 
(hacker 1998, p. 30). 
I claim that we can be meta-philosophically careful and develop theories in philosophy 
at the same time. We do not have to take for granted the Wittgensteinian requirement of not 
building philosophical theories. It is enough to agree with him about their special status. I 
think that the solutions from our theories cannot be treated as absolute, timeless, totally 
autonomous. In opposition to Wittgenstein, we can do philosophy in which descriptions help 
to answer the questions we have raised, descriptions which are not only tools for challenging 
these questions. It is worth describing the functions of natural language by studying language 
use. In other words, it is worth to do what has not been done by Wittgenstein, i.e. to develop 
use theories of meaning. Wittgenstein’s works should not be just a source of attractive 
quotations, which help to illustrate almost every thought and every theory. I claim that there 
are many theoretical traces and important philosophical issues developed in his books which 
can be starting points for an interesting philosophical theory of language. We just have to 
learn how to derive conclusions from them for our own philosophical works. 
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